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ARTICLE
THE UBIQUITOUS BLACKBERRY:
THE NEW OVERTIME LIABILITY
Maria L. Barbu†
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphone use,1 and in particular BlackBerry use, “has become so
commonplace that it is second nature.”2 Employees are checking their
smartphones before they fall asleep, immediately when they wake up, while
watching a baseball game with the family, while on their way to work, or
while having coffee at the local coffee shop. With technology now allowing
connectivity twenty-four hours a day, more and more employees are using
smartphones to answer work related phone calls and e-mails after work.
This phenomenon has lead to a recent wave of wage-and-hour litigation,3
with employees claiming overtime compensation for all the hours they have

† J.D. Candidate (2011), Washington University School of Law; B.A. Political
Science and Economics (2007), Columbia University. I would like to thank my family,
particularly my parents Violeta and Daniel for their support. Additionally, I thank Shifan
Mahroof and the dedicated editors and staff of the LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW for
their valuable insight and comments throughout the writing process.
1. “[A] smartphone is a device that lets [the users] make telephone calls, but also adds
in features that [the user] might find on a personal digital assistant or a computer—such as
the ability to send and receive e-mail and edit Office documents.” Liane Cassavoy, What
http://smartphones.about.com/od/
Makes
a
Smartphone
Smart?,
ABOUT.COM,
smartphonebasics/a/what_is_smart.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2010); see generally PEI ZHENG
& LIONEL NI, SMART PHONE & NEXT GENERATION MOBILE COMPUTING 2-6 (2006)
(describing what constitutes a smartphone). The BlackBerry, developed by the Canadian
company Research in Motion (RIM), and the Apple iPhone are two of the most common
smartphones currently in use in the United States. See Prince McLean, Canalys: iPhone
Outsold All Windows Mobile Phones in Q2 2009, APPLEINSIDER (Aug. 21, 2009),
http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/09/08/21/canalys_iphone_outsold_all_windows_mobil
e_phones_in_q2_2009.html (describing how RIM is holding a commanding fifty-two
percent share of U.S. smartphones, while Apple’s iPhone has grabbed a twenty-three percent
share). According to a recent estimate, one billion smartphones will be shipped by 2012. See
Mika Raento, Antti Oulasvirta & Nathan Eagle, Smartphones: An Emerging Tool for Social
Scientists, 37 SOC. METHODS RES. 426, 427 (2009).
2. Jeffrey M. Schlossberg & Kimberly B. Malerba, Tech-Tock: Are Employees Who
Check Devices Off Hours Entitled to Overtime Pay?, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 2007, at 9.
3. See infra Part II.
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spent answering phone calls or checking e-mails on their smartphones while
off-the-clock.
There is a large appetite for smartphones in the corporate world.4 In the
United States, “sixteen million corporate-liable smartphones are in use
today out of a total workforce of 155 million people.”5 Companies find that
employee use of these devices supports greater productivity, efficiency, and
flexibility.6 Evidence suggests that an increasing number of employers are
not only amenable to the employees’ use of smartphones, but have come to
expect that their employees use these devices after-hours.7 Furthermore,
4. Tim Weingarten, Lowering the Corporate Threshold for Smartphones, VISAGE
MOBILE (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:17 AM), http://www.visagemobile.com/news/blogs/833/
lowering-the-corporate-threshold-for-smartphones/;
see
also
ALASTAIR SWEENY,
BLACKBERRY P LANET: THE STORY OF RESEARCH IN MOTION AND THE LITTLE DEVICE THAT
TOOK THE WORLD BY STORM 2 (2009) (“An astounding 85 percent of public corporations are
supplying staff with the devices, and . . . [t]oday, more than 500,000 devices are installed in
every department of the U.S. government and throughout the US Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
5. Weingarten, supra note 4 (indicating that a report from Credit Suisse has predicted
an “acceleration of smartphone market growth”).
6. See Lei-da Chen & Cynthia L. Corritore, A Theoretical Model of Nomadic Culture:
Assumptions, Values, Artifacts, and the Impact on Employee Job Satisfaction, 22 COMMC’NS
ASS’N FOR INFO. SYS. 235, 236 (2008) (describing the benefits of remote computing as
“improved productivity, removal of temporal and spatial constraints, improved access to key
decision-makers, enhanced access to rich business data, and freedom.”); Catherine A.
Middleton, Illusions of Balance and Control in an Always-On Environment: A Case Study of
BlackBerry Users, 21 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUDIES 165, 167 (2007)
(describing the BlackBerry as a “tool of efficiency, providing control over users’
communication needs from any location, and enabling responsiveness and accessibility at all
times.”); Gayle Porter, Implications of Employer-Supplied Connectivity Devices,
WORLDATWORK 7 (2009), http://www.worldatwork.org/waw/adimLink?id=32005 (noting
that companies find that employer-supplied connectivity devices allow flexibility, as
employees “can be reached and have the tools to step into work mode at any time should the
need arise.”). But see Catherine A. Middleton & Wendy Cukier, Is Mobile Email Functional
or Dysfunctional? Two Perspectives on Mobile Email Usage, 15 EURO. J. INFO. SYS. 252,
254-55 (2006) (indicating that in the name of efficiency, which is a functional attribute,
BlackBerry users carry out dysfunctional dangerous practices, such as emailing while
driving).
7. See Porter, supra note 6, at 7. The research study also notes that in organizations
that supply these devices to employees, “employees will be more likely to describe the
culture as one that expects them to be accessible outside of traditional work hours.” Id. at 29;
see also Melissa Mazmanian, Joanne Yates & Wanda Orlikowski, Ubiquitous Email:
Individual Experiences and Organizational Consequences of Blackberry Use, 65 ACAD.
MGMT. ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS (2006), available at http://seeit.mit.edu/
Publications/BlackBerry_AoM.pdf (indicating that while “[o]n the one hand, BlackBerry use
allows for increased mobility, communication during ‘down time,’ and reduction of

2010]

THE UBIQUITOUS BLACKBERRY

49

while smartphones used to be supplied only to executives and managers
within a company because of their high cost, this is not the case anymore.8
Smartphones have become cheaper and companies are providing the
devices to lower-level employees who are entitled to overtime
compensation under the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),9 the
federal statute regulating overtime compensation.
With smartphones becoming an inexpensive investment for companies,
and with the recession adding pressure on employers, companies are trying
to do the same amount of work with fewer people,10 leading to more and
more FLSA covered employees using BlackBerrys and other smartphones
for off-the-clock work-related communication. This practice has created a
number of current FLSA lawsuits in which employees are demanding pay
for the overtime hours earned while tapping on their smartphones.11
This Article examines how smartphone overtime claims challenge the
existing overtime case law, proposes a new framework for analyzing
smartphone overtime claims, and advocates for ways in which smartphone
litigation can be avoided. Part I provides an overview of the existing
overtime case law regarding on-call time and time spent engaged in
preliminary or postliminary work activities and explores the different
standards used by courts in deciding what constitutes compensable time.
Part II analyzes how off-the-clock smartphone use situations challenge the
current overtime standards. Part III proposes a new framework that courts
can use in properly assessing whether employees using smartphones offthe-clock are entitled to overtime compensation. Finally, Part IV examines

moment-to-moment stress. On the other hand, expectations of responsiveness have
intensified and become taken for granted.”).
8. See Dan Woods, The End Of The BlackBerry Elite, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/20/smartphone-mobile-iphone-technology-cio-networkblackberry.html.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). For a detailed discussion of the FLSA, see infra Part I.
10. See Michael Sanserino, Lawsuits Question After-Hours Demands of Email and
Cellphones, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at B1.
11. See infra Part II (discussing the current lawsuits). Before any of these recent lawsuits were
filed, the media extensively discussed the potential liability of having employees use smartphones
after hours. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Overtime Suits May Ripen with BlackBerrys, NAT. L. J., Apr. 28,
2008, at 6; Elizabeth Stull, Employment Law: Wary of Wireless?, DAILY RECORD, July 27, 2009, at
1, 7; Beware of the Thorns in the BlackBerry Patch, AM. MGMT. ASS’N (Sept. 17, 2008),
http://www.amanet.org/training/articles/Beware-of-the-Thorns-in-the-BlackBerry-Patch.aspx; Daniel
A. Schwartz, The BlackBerry Issue: How PDAs Can Create Serious Wage and Overtime Issues,
CONN. EMP’T L. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2009/02/articles/
wage-and-hour/the-blackberry-issue-how-pdas-can-create-serious-wage-and-overtime-issues/.
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the different options that employees and employers have to avoid
smartphone overtime lawsuits.
I. FLSA AND THE HISTORY OF OVERTIME LAW
This Part provides an overview of the current overtime case law by
examining the FLSA coverage to see which employees are able to sue for
overtime, by looking at the definition of work provided by the FLSA, and
finally by discussing two forms of overtime—on-call time and time spent
performing a work activity that is preliminary or postliminary to an
employee’s job.
A. FLSA Coverage: Who Can Sue for Overtime?
An analysis of wage liability in the case of after hours smartphone use
needs to start with the identification of which employees are entitled to
overtime compensation under the FLSA. Not all employees are covered
under the FLSA overtime provision12 or entitled to overtime compensation
for “a workweek longer than forty hours.”13 An employment relationship
needs to exist,14 meaning that to be covered, a worker must be an employee,
defined as an “individual employed by an employer.”15 To benefit from the
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006). The purpose of the overtime provision was to
compensate workers for the “burden of a workweek beyond the hours fixed in the Act” and
to reduce unemployment by distributing the available work to unemployed workers.
Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942), superseded by
statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2006), as recognized in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n. 22 (1985).
14. The FLSA defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). Independent contractors are not “employees” under the FLSA.
See id. To determine whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor,
courts have adopted different versions of the economic realities test. See Brock v. Superior
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (indicating that the inquiry
whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee is “whether, as a matter
of economic reality, the workers depend upon someone else’s business for the opportunity to
render service or are in business for themselves.”). For a description of the multi-factor
economic realities test, see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947). While some
courts have embraced a multi-factor economic realities test, others are looking at only four
factors. See Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)
(determining that the four factors are “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to
hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or
conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4)
maintained employment records.”).
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protection of the FLSA, an employee must also be “engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce”16 or must be employed in an
“enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce”17
Furthermore, the FLSA specifies a number of categories of employees
who are excluded from its coverage.18 On one hand, employees at the top
end of the occupational hierarchy who are “employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional capacity,”19 or who are “outside
salesm[e]n” or computer professionals, are not covered under the FLSA.20
The exemption for this category of workers is also referred to as the whitecollar exemption.21 On the other hand, workers who are at the bottom of the
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1) (2006); see also Boekemeier v. Fourth Universalist
Soc’y, 86 F. Supp. 2d 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S.
491, 497 (1943) (noting that “[t]he test . . . is not whether the employee’s activities affect or
indirectly relate to interstate commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related
to the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it”).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1). The enterprise coverage provision was added to the
FLSA in 1961 and broadened the scope of the statute. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 n.8 (1985). Even if 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) provides a
definition of “enterprise” as “the related activities performed (either through unified
operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose,”
there have still been a number of cases dealing with the issue of whether certain employers
can be characterized as “enterprises” for the purpose of the FLSA. See, e.g., Donovan v.
Easton Land & Dev., Inc., 723 F.2d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a hotel and
lounge were not an “enterprise” because of lack of related activities and common business
purpose); Chao v. Vidtape, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 281, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
Vidtape and Inventive were an “enterprise”).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006). The employer has the burden of proving that the
employee falls within one of the exceptions enumerated by the statute. See Douglas v. ArgoTech Corp., 113 F.3d 67, 70 (6th Cir. 1997).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see, e.g., Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
2d 1207, 1222-23 (D.N.M. 2008) (holding that employee’s BlackBerry use did not entitle
employee to overtime because of employee’s managerial role). See generally Peter D.
DeChiara, Rethinking the Managerial-Professional Exemption of the Fair Labor Standard
Act, 43 AM. U. L. Rev. 139, 140 (1993) (arguing that the FLSA exemption of managerial and
professional employees has no legitimate rationale). To determine whether an employee falls
under the white-collar exemption, courts look at the function performed by the employee,
rather than the title of the position held by the employee. See Anderson v. City of Cleveland,
90 F. Supp. 2d 906, 916-17 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), (17); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.600 (2010) (setting the
salary cutoff for overtime exemptions to $455 per week for all executive, administrative or
professional exempt employees).
21. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-164, FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT: WHITE-COLLAR EXEMPTIONS IN THE MODERN WORK PLACE (1999).
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occupational hierarchy, such as employees of seasonal amusement and
recreational businesses and agricultural and domestic workers, are not
covered either.22 As a general rule, these exceptions for employees at the
top and lower end of the occupational hierarchy are “to be ‘narrowly
construed against the employers seeking to assert [them].’”23
B. Work: FLSA’s Undefined Element
Determining whether an FLSA non-exempt employee is entitled to
compensation for the after-hours use of her smartphone—be that in the
context of on-call time24 or as a preliminary or postliminary work
activity25—involves examining the definition of “work.”26 If on-call duty is
not “work,” the employee need only receive compensation for time spent
actively responding to her employer’s call on her smartphone, but if on-call
time is “work,” the employee must be paid at least the minimum wage for
the time spent on-call.27 Similarly, if time spent performing a preliminary or
postliminary activity to the employee’s job is not “work,” the employee will
receive compensation only for his or her set work hours, but if time spent
performing a preliminary or postliminary work activity is “work,” the
employee must be paid at least the minimum wage for that time.28
However, there is little statutory and regulatory guidance as to what
constitutes “work” for the purpose of the FLSA overtime provision. The

22. For a comprehensive list of all workers at the low end of the occupational hierarchy
who are not covered under the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)–(16), (b)(1)–(30).
23. Douglas, 113 F.3d at 70 (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky Inc., 36 U.S. 388, 392
(1960)); see Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir. 1995); Avery v.
City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1994).
24. See infra Part I.C (discussing on-call time in detail).
25. See infra Part I.D (discussing time spent performing preliminary or postliminary
work activities in detail).
26. See Gretchen Fuss, Refining the Tenth Circuit’s Stance on Employee Rights: The
ADA, Free Speech in the Workplace, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 79 DENV. U. L. REV.
433, 448 (2002) (indicating that “the definition of ‘work’ becomes key to the issue of on-call
time”).
27. Eric Phillips, Note, On-Call Time Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 2633, 2634 (1997) (footnote omitted). The issue is the time spent waiting to be called
by the employer, not the time spent actually responding to the employer’s calls. Id. at 2634
n.8.
28. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 33 (2006) (indicating that preliminary and
postliminary work activities are compensable and thus considered “work” if they are
“integral and indispensable” to “principal activities”).
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FLSA does not define “work,”29 but just indicates that to “employ includes
to suffer or permit to work.”30 Furthermore, “Congress did not include a
definition of the term ‘hours worked’ when enacting the original
legislation”31 and the Portal-to-Portal Act that amended the FLSA also
omits any definition of the word “work.”32 The Department of Labor (DOL)
does not provide any additional guidance when it defines compensable time
as time during which an employee is “on duty on the employer’s premises
or at a prescribed workplace, as well as all other time during which the
employee is suffered or permitted to work for the employer.”33
With little guidance from statutes and DOL regulations as to what
constitutes “work” for the purpose of the FLSA overtime provision, the
judicial branch is left as the only source that can provide assistance in
identifying the instances that overtime qualifies as compensable time.34 An
examination of the existing case law regarding the two most common types
of overtime—on-call time and time spent performing preliminary and
postliminary work activities—will provide insight into whether off-theclock smartphone use constitutes “work.”
C. On-Call Time
On-call time is the time an employee spends when she is physically away
from the workplace; remains connected to it by smartphone, normal
telephone, beeper, or computer; and must respond to the employer’s calls.35
29. Id. at 25 (footnote omitted) (“Neither ‘work’ nor ‘workweek’ is defined in the
statute.”).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006). The FLSA “was not intended to cover those without
any express or implied compensation who may work for their own advantage on the
premises of another.” Morgan K. Whitlatch & Alexei Klestoff, Employment-Related Crimes,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555, 580 n.136 (2001) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Brouwer v. Metro.
Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Dade County jurors were not
employees for purposes of the FLSA); Donovan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 726 F.2d 415,
416-17 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that flight attendant trainees were not employees for
purposes of the FLSA).
31. Elizabeth D. Feigin, Note, Achieving Justice for On-Call Workers: Amending the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 84 IOWA L. REV. 351, 352 n.8 (quoting [1 Wages-Hours] Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) P 25,301 (1998)).
32. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 26.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(b) (2010).
34. See Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 (1942) (determining that Congress
had given to the judicial branch the responsibility to interpret the provisions of the FLSA).
35. Phillips, supra note 27, at 2633 (footnote omitted) (indicating that although an
employee has greater freedom to be involved in personal activities than she does while
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Because the FLSA does not provide a definition of “work,”36 the issue of
when an on-call employee is working has been addressed by the Supreme
Court and more recently by the lower courts.37
The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of on-call compensation in 1944
when it decided Armour & Co. v. Wantock38 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,39
two cases involving firefighters required to remain on the employer’s
premises while off duty.40 In Armour, the Supreme Court specified that time
spent waiting for work is compensable under the FLSA, if the waiting time
is “spen[t] predominantly for the employer’s benefit.”41
In Skidmore, the Court indicated that time spent “waiting to be engaged”
is not compensable under the FLSA, but if the employees are “engaged to
wait” time is compensable.42 “For example, a secretary who reads a book
while waiting for dictation or a fireman who plays checkers while waiting
for an alarm” is “engaged to wait.”43 An inquiry into whether time was
“spen[t] predominantly for the employer’s benefit” is necessary to
distinguish between “waiting to be engaged” and “engaged to wait.”44 The
Skidmore Court held that this inquiry involves looking at four factors: (1)
the “construction of the agreements between the particular parties”
regarding on-call time; (2) the “appraisal of [the] practical construction of
the working agreement[s] by conduct;” (3) the nature of the job and “its
relation to the waiting time;” and (4) “all of the surrounding
working a normal shift, the employee “is never truly free from work” and should expect to
be interrupted by the employer’s calls at any time).
36. See supra Part I.B.
37. See infra notes 38-69 and accompanying text.
38. 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
39. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
40. See Feigin, supra note 31, 359-61 (discussing the two cases).
41. 323 U.S. at 132-33.
42. 323 U.S. at 137.
43. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #22: Hours Worked Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. WAGE & HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs22.pdf (last updated July 2008).
44. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133; see also Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary’s Hosp’s,
Inc., 164 F.3d 1056, 1058 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (trying to make
a sense of the distinction between “waiting to be engaged” and “engaged to wait” by holding
that “where the conditions placed on the employee’s activities are so restrictive that the
employee cannot use the time effectively for personal pursuits, such time spent on-call is
compensable.”). But see Owens v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 354 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted) (holding that the proper test “is not the importance of on-call work to the
employer, rather the test is focused on the employee and whether he is so restricted during
on-call hours as to be effectively engaged to wait.”).
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circumstances.”45 However, the Supreme Court “did not regard these four
factors as an exclusive list”46 and specified that it did not lay down a single
“legal formula to resolve cases so varied in their facts.”47
Unlike the Armour and Skidmore “waiting time” cases, where
“employees were required to remain on or close to the employer’s premises,
most contemporary on-call arrangements provide for greater physical
freedom, permitting employees to go home and perform certain tasks for
the employer without having to return to the employer’s premises.”48 In
some cases, on-call employees have to be on-call longer than their work
shifts and some “employees may be placed on call the entire time they are
not performing their regular service.”49
Faced with a new pattern of on-call situations and little guidance from
the Supreme Court as to what constitutes compensable and noncompensable on-call time,50 lower courts have adopted different
interpretations of what constitutes compensable time.51 While the Tenth
Circuit has been more lenient in its inquiry by focusing its attention on the
burden of the on-call duty on the employee’s personal pursuits,52 the Fifth,
45. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137.
46. Feigin, supra note 31, at 360 (footnote omitted).
47. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136.
48. Phillips, supra note 27, at 2638-39 (footnotes omitted). For a recent example of a
case involving the circumscription of the employee’s freedom to move, see Brigham v.
Eugene Water & Electric Board, 357 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2004).
49. Phillips, supra note 27, at 2639 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Bright v. Houston
Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an
employee who was always on-call when not at work was not entitled to overtime
compensation), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992); Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm’n,
938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that employees who were on call twenty-four
hours a day were entitled to overtime compensation).
50. See Feigin, supra note 31, at 361 (indicating that the Supreme Court in Skidmore
and Armour failed “to articulate a workable standard for determining on-call
compensability”).
51. See id. at 361-63; Phillips, supra note 27, at 2639-40.
52. See Phillips, supra note 27, at 2639; see, e.g., Andrews v. Town of Skiatook, 123
F.3d 1327, 1329-30, 1332 (10th Cir. 1997) (involving restrictions such as constant
availability by pager, clean and appropriate dress, inability to drink alcohol, and ability to be
in the ambulance responding to a call within five to ten minutes); Gilligan v. City of
Emporia, 986 F.2d 410, 411, 413 (10th Cir. 1993) (involving restrictions such as constant
availability by pager, inability to drink alcohol, and ability to report within thirty minutes or
one hour of a call); Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432-33 (10th Cir. 1992)
(involving requirements that detectives on-call remained sober, could be reached by beeper,
and could report to duty within twenty minutes); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529,
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Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits award compensation only when a severe
burden was placed on the employee.53 The circuits dealing with the
question of what constitutes compensable time have looked at two
predominant factors: (1) “the degree to which the employee is free to
engage in personal activities;”54 and (2) “the agreements between the
particular parties.”55
In determining the degree to which the employee is free to engage in
personal activities while on-call, the circuits use different factors in their
1537-38 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving restriction such as responding to an average three to
five callbacks per twenty-four hour period), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 915 (1992). But see
Boehm v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that on-call time was not spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit in spite of
company’s policy requiring employee to spend some time at home that the employee would
not have spent otherwise); Norton v. Worthen Van Serv., Inc., 839 F.2d 653, 654, 656 (10th
Cir. 1988) (holding that on-call time was not spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit
in spite of restriction to be “near enough to the employer’s premises to be able to respond to
calls within fifteen to twenty minutes”).
53. See Phillips, supra note 27, at 2639; see, e.g., Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d
802, 810 (11th Cir. 1992) (requiring that “employee’s free time must be severely restricted”
in order to be compensated); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Comm’n, 968 F.2d 606, 611 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that to prevail an employee must show that the on-call duty “seriously”
interfered with the employee’s personal activities); Bright, 934 F.2d at 678 (recognizing that
plaintiff’s on-call status made plaintiff’s job “highly undesirable and arguably somewhat
oppressive,” but nevertheless holding that “the FLSA’s overtime provisions are more
narrowly focused than being simply directed at requiring extra compensation for oppressive
or confining conditions of employment”); Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805
F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that plaintiffs
who were required to remain on the employer’s premises were not entitled to overtime
compensation because they “were free to sleep, eat, watch television . . . [and] seldom or
never did any physical work after their shift ended”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987);
Allen v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that time
was not spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit even if plaintiffs were required to
remain on the premises of the employer’s refinery during a two-and-one-half month
production worker’s strike).
54. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944); see, e.g., Owens v. Local No.
169, 971 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1992); Bright, 934 F.2d at 677-78; Halferty v. Pulse Drug
Co., 864 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1989).
55. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137; see, e.g., Owens, 971 F.2d at 354-55; Brock v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 826 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1987); Rousseau, 805 F.2d at 1248. The
Supreme Court set the stage for the inquiry into the agreements between the parties: An
inquiry into compensability of on-call waiting time “involves scrutiny and construction of
the agreements between the particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of the
working agreement by conduct. . . . The law does not impose an arrangement upon the
parties. It imposes upon the courts the task of finding what the arrangement was.” Skidmore,
323 U.S. at 137.
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analysis, with no one factor being held dispositive.56 The Ninth Circuit, for
example, has adopted a list of seven factors, which is a compilation of
factors used by other circuits and the Supreme Court:57 (1) whether the
employee was required to remain at the employer’s place of business;58 (2)
whether there were excessive geographical restrictions placed on the
employee;59 (3) whether the frequency of calls was restrictive;60 (4) whether
a fixed time limit for response was unduly restrictive;61 (5) whether the oncall employee could easily trade on-call responsibilities;62 (6) the method
used to communicate a call to the employee;63 and (7) whether the
employee actually engaged in personal activities while on-call.64
Nevertheless, other circuits use fewer and different factors,65 resulting in
56. See Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Owens, 971 F.2d at 351). Courts balance these factors. Id.
57. See Miner v. B & C Equip., Inc., No. 93-35401, 1994 WL 198692, at *2-5 (9th Cir.
May 18, 1994); Owens, 971 F.2d at 351. Owens also provides the source for each factor. See
infra notes 58-64.
58. See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 134 (1944) (holding that
firefighters restricted to the fire station were not free to use off-duty time for personal
pursuits); see also 29 C.F.R. § 553.221 (2010) (“An employee who is not required to remain
on the employer’s premises but is merely required to leave word at his home or with
company officials where he may be reached is not working while on call.”).
59. See, e.g., Cross v. Ark. Forestry Comm’n, 938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the requirement to remain within a thirty-five to fifty mile radius to monitor
radio transmission did not permit employees to use on-call time for their own purposes).
60. See, e.g., Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1538 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that firefighters required to answer an average of three to five calls a day were not free to use
off-duty time for personal pursuits), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 915 (1992).
61. See, e.g., Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 678
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a biomedical repair technician was able to engage in personal
activities despite the twenty or thirty minute required response time), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1036 (1992).
62. See, e.g., Brock v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 826 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the on-call policy was not unduly restrictive in part because employees could
trade on-call responsibilities).
63. See, e.g., Norton v. Worthen Van Serv., Inc., 839 F.2d 653, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that drivers could purchase a simple paging device to allay the necessity of staying
by a phone).
64. See, e.g., id. at 655 (holding that employees’ on-call time spent “at the homes of
friends, at church, at laundromats, at restaurants, at pool halls, and at a local gymnasium”
demonstrated their ability to engage in personal activities).
65. See, e.g., Cross v. Ark. Forestry Comm’n, 938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991)
(emphasizing the ability to travel or to engage in personal activities, the required response
time, the difficulty of monitoring calls, the possibility of the need to respond immediately,
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different circuit courts reaching different conclusions in cases with similar
facts.66
As previously noted, the agreement between parties is another
predominant factor in determining whether the on-call time was spent
mainly for the employer’s benefit.67 There are three different types of
agreements between employer and employees, which are relevant to the
issue of on-call compensation: (1) a collective bargaining agreement “that
provides overtime compensation for actual call-in work, but not for other
off-duty work;” (2) a constructive agreement that arises if an employee has
“been informed of the overtime compensation policy and continue[s] to
work under the disclosed terms of the policy;” and (3) an express
agreement.68 Nevertheless, agreements, although a predominant and
relevant factor to be considered in the on-call analysis, are not dispositive
and not always controlling.69
D. Preliminary and Postliminary Work Activities
On-call time is not the only type of overtime covered under the FLSA
and relevant to the analysis of smartphone overtime compensation. An
employee could be entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA for
the time spent on activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the
employee’s job, meaning those activities completed before or after the
official work shift.70 Examples of preliminary and postliminary work

and whether the on-call employee was ever relieved from duty); Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1537-38
(emphasizing the number of callbacks, whether the employee could hold another job,
whether the employee could trade shifts, and whether the time could be used for personal
pursuits).
66. See Phillips, supra note 27, at 2640.
67. See Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1994); Owens v.
Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 354 (9th Cir. 1992).
68. Berry, 30 F.3d at 1180-81 (“An agreement between the parties which provides at
least some type of compensation for on-call waiting time may suggest the parties
characterize waiting time as work. Conversely, an agreement pursuant to which the
employees are to be paid only for time spent actually working, and not merely waiting to
work, may suggest the parties do not characterize waiting time as work.”); see also Owens,
971 F.2d at 354-55.
69. See Berry, 30 F.3d at 1181 (indicating that “emphasis of the parties’ agreements as a
predominant factor is not intended to suggest that agreements are controlling regardless of
the character of the uncompensated time at issue”); see also Owens, 971 F.2d at 354.
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2006) (defining preliminary and postliminary work
activities as those “which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which
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activities include walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual work
place, time spent donning (putting on) and doffing (taking off) uniforms or
protective equipment, or time spent checking necessary e-mails before or
after the work shift.71
The Portal-to-Portal Act72 amended the FLSA in 1947 to specifically
relieve employers of the obligation to compensate employees for
“‘activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal
activity or activities,’”73 thus limiting employers’ liability.74 Congress
adopted the Portal-to-Portal Act in response to Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co.,75 a Supreme Court case that opened the gates to litigation by
expanding compensable work under the FLSA to activities such as walking
to work stations and donning necessary work gear.76
While the Portal-to-Portal Act placed limitations on the FLSA, the
Supreme Court created an exception to these limitations in IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez.77 In Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that walking to and from
changing areas to work areas was compensable time, but time spent waiting
such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he
ceases, such principal activity or activities”).
71. See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40-42 (2006) (holding that walking to
and from changing areas to work areas was compensable time); Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S.
247, 256 (1956) (holding that donning and doffing of the protective gear before and after the
actual work shift were compensable activities); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328
U.S. 680, 690-92 (1946) (holding as compensable the time spent walking from a time clock
to the production floor, as well as time spent conducting the preliminary activity of donning
non-protective gear).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The Portal-to-Portal Act also excludes commuting time from
compensable time. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 785.35 (2010). However, in some instances travel time is
compensable. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.36–785.41 (enumerating the exceptions when travel
time is compensable).
73. Von Friewalde v. Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., 339 F. App’x 448, 454 (5th
Cir. 2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)). Specifically, the Portal-to-Portal Act restricts the
definition of a compensable workday and defines the preliminary and postliminary work
activities. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2006).
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
75. 328 U.S. at 690-92 (holding that time spent walking from time clocks at factory gate
to workstations was compensable).
76. Congress noted that FLSA had “been interpreted judicially in disregard of longestablished customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, [and]
thereby created wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in
operation.” 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006).
77. 546 U.S. 21 (2006). Alvarez resolved the circuit split between IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,
339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d in part, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) and Tum v. Barber Foods,
Inc., 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004), rev’d in part, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
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to change was not statutory compensable.78 The Court expanded the
compensable workday by indicating that preliminary and postliminary work
activities are compensable if they are “integral and indispensable” to
“principal activities.”79 However, the Court’s holding in Alvarez has left
many questions unanswered, such as what constitutes “any activity that is
‘integral and indispensable’”80 and what are the appropriate boundaries of a
workday.81 Lower courts have attempted to grapple with these questions
and in Dunlop v. City Electric, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the proper
test “to determine which activities are ‘principal’ and which are ‘an integral
and indispensable part’ of such activities, is . . . whether the activities in
question . . . are performed as part of the regular work of the employees in
the ordinary course of business.”82

78. 546 U.S. at 41-42. Time waiting to doff was compensable because it occurred after
the principal activity, while time spent waiting to don was not compensable because it
constituted a preliminary activity. Id. The Supreme Court also noted that “the fact that
certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to engage in their principal activities
does not mean that those preshift activities are ‘integral and indispensable’ to a ‘principal
activity.’” Id.
79. Id. at 33. Principal job activities are those that primarily benefit the employer. Id. at
25. The Supreme Court held that “any activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a
‘principal activity’ is itself a ‘principal activity’ under § 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.” Id.
at 37.
80. Christine D. Higgins, Note, Can I Get Paid for That?: The Compensability of
Commuting Time Post-IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), 86 NEB. L. REV. 208, 218
(2007) (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37).
81. See Lynn M. Carroll, Case Comment, Employment Law—Fair Labor Standards Act
Requires Compensation for Employees Walking To and From Workstations—IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 126 S. Ct. 514 (2005), 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 769, 776 (2007) (discussing how the
failure to “fully define the scope of the workday . . . could result in an onslaught of
employment litigation to determine the actual limitations of these concepts”); Neville F.
Dastoor & Shane T. Munoz, Column, Labor and Employment Law: IBP v. Alvarez, 80 FLA.
B.J. 37, 40 (2006) (“Questions also exist as to the practical breadth of the compensable
workday.”).
82. 527 F.2d 394, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1976) (mentioning that the proper test is “not
whether the activities in question are uniquely related to the predominant activity of the
business”). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similarly broad definition of “principal
activities.” See Rutti v. LoJack Corp., 596 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dunlop,
527 F.2d at 401) (indicating that “principal activities” are those “necessary to the business
and . . . performed by the employees, primarily for the benefit of the employer, in the
ordinary course of that business”); Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.
1984) (internal quotation marks omitted) (indicating that the term “principal activities” is to
be liberally construed “to include any work of consequence performed for an employer no
matter when the work is performed”).
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Furthermore, while an employee is entitled to compensation for
preliminary or postliminary work activities that are “integral and
indispensable” to “principal activities,”83 those particular activities also
cannot be de minimis.84 However, courts are still struggling to define what
amounts to de minimis work.85 While the period that is normally regarded
as a cut-off for de minimis overtime is ten minutes,86 “that number had not
been treated as a rigid maximum.”87 Thus, there is no precise amount of
time set by the courts where an employee may be denied compensation
because the time worked was de minimis.88 Rather, courts follow a threeprong factor test to determine whether time was de minimis: “(1) the
practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the
aggregate amount of compensable time; and (3) the regularity of the
additional work.”89 The test reflects a balance between requiring an
employer to pay for the activities it demands from its employees and the

83. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
84. The de minimis rule was first advanced by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Mt.
Clements Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). The Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen the
matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled
working hours, such trifles may be disregarded. . . . It is only when an employee is required
to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable working time is
involved.” Id. at 692.
85. See Eric Kendall Banks & Stacia Boden, Off-the-Clock Considerations: “On the
Phone” Can Mean “On the Clock” for Employees, KUTAK ROCK LLP,
http://www.kutakrock.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=DspNewsDetails&id=1149&site_id=45&c
at=1 (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
86. A number of courts have found daily periods of ten minutes as de minimis. See, e.g.,
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Harrup, 227 F.2d 133, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1955) (ten
minutes); Green v. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir. 1949) (ten
minutes); Carter v. Panama Canal Co., 314 F. Supp. 386, 392 (D.D.C. 1970) (two to fifteen
minutes), aff’d, 463 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972). But see Usery
v. City Elec., No. A-71-CA-67, 1976 WL 1697, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 1976) (fifteen to
twenty minutes not de minimis).
87. Carlsen v. United States, 521 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
88. See Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Frank v.
Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949)) (noting that “[n]o rigid rule can be applied
with mathematical certainty” to determine the de minimis time). “Rather, common sense
must be applied to the facts of each case.” Id.
89. Rutti v. LoJack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lindow,
738 F.2d at 1063) (holding that the application of the three-prong test to the facts of the case
did not compel a conclusion that plaintiff’s after-hours PDT transmissions to his employer
were de minimis).
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need to avoid “[s]plit-second absurdities” that “are not justified by the
actuality of working conditions.”90
II. CHALLENGING THE OVERTIME FRAMEWORK
Through the existing overtime case law, courts have developed standards
for what constitutes “work” in the context of the on-call time and the time
spent performing preliminary and postliminary work activities.91 While
courts have successfully applied these standards in cases involving portable
communication devices such as cell phones and pagers,92 courts have just
started to deal with smartphone overtime claims.93 This Part explores the
challenges that courts will face in applying the current overtime standards
to claims involving off-the-clock smartphone use and concludes that courts
will have to adopt new factors in order to properly analyze and decide
smartphone overtime claims.
A. The On-Call Time Standard and the Smartphone
Rulli v. CB Richard Ellis Inc.,94 a case that has not been decided yet, is
emblematic of the new wave of smartphone on-call claims.95 John Rulli, a
90. Id. (quoting Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062).
91. See supra Part I.C and Part I.D.
92. See, e.g., Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 486-89 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the employer’s on-call policy at issue presented no objective restrictions on the
employees’ off-duty time besides requiring them to carry pagers and the employees failed to
demonstrate that they received so many calls that they could not effectively use their offduty time); Whitten v. City of Easley, 62 F. App’x 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
firefighters who were allowed to maintain a part-time job and pursue personal interests while
they were on call and carrying a pager were waiting to be engaged and were not entitled to
overtime pay for the periods they were on call).
93. Smartphone overtime lawsuits were first filed in 2009. See infra notes 94-98. With
smartphones being regarded as better satisfying “the needs of businesses for cost-effective,
highly efficient, and robust operations” than traditional cell phones or pagers, it is likely that
courts will experience a reduction in cell phone and pager overtime cases and an increase in
smartphone overtime cases. See ZHENG & NI, supra note 1, at 16; see also Jeffrey Selingo,
The Bell Is Tolling for the Beeper, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at G1 (describing the pager as
a “dying technology”).
94. Complaint, Rulli v. CB Richard Ellis Inc., No. 09-CV-00289 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 13,
2009). As of November 2010, the case is still in the discovery phase.
95. Another similar case is Agui v. T-Mobile USA Inc., No. 09-2955 (E.D.N.Y. July 10,
2009). In Agui, a number of T-Mobile employees alleged that they were issued smartphones
and were required to review and respond to communications (telephone calls, conference
calls, e-mails, and text messages) from other T-Mobile employees at all hours without being
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Wisconsin maintenance worker, claimed he and other nonexempt
maintenance workers were required to use company-issued BlackBerrys
after-hours in violation of the FLSA.96 The complaint in Rulli maintained
that the maintenance workers were expected to have their BlackBerrys with
them at all times and were expected to return any call or message within
fifteen minutes.97 Plaintiffs asked for “relief under the FLSA for unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys’ fees,
declaratory and/or injunctive relief.”98
Rulli describes employees using their smartphones to make phone
calls, send text messages, or answer e-mails while on-call and without
receiving overtime compensation.99 To decide whether employees like the
ones in Rulli are entitled to overtime compensation, courts will apply the
current on-call standard and look at the agreements between the parties
regarding overtime compensation, as well as at the employee’s ability to
engage in personal activities.100
Courts are likely not to find any agreements between the employer and
employee regarding overtime compensation, as at least one study has
shown that most companies do not have in place any written or oral policies
dealing with overtime compensation for after-hours smartphone use.101 As
paid overtime. Complaint at 9-10, Agui v. T-Mobile USA Inc., No. 09-2955 (E.D.N.Y. July
10, 2009). When the T-Mobile employees reported the overtime hours to the management,
the “employees were told nothing could be done and they should expect to work extra hours
as part of T-Mobile’s ‘standard business practices.’” Ashby Jones, A Boom in ‘Overtime’
Lawsuits? Blame Technology, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2009, 9:03 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/08/10/a-boom-in-overtime-lawsuits-blame-technology/
(describing the details of Agui v. T-Mobile USA Inc.). Plaintiffs sought to recover wages on
behalf of themselves and other retail sales associates and supervisors for time worked “for
which they received no compensation at all.” Complaint, supra note 94, at 1. The case was
closed when the parties signed a confidential settlement. See Stipulation of Dismissal with
Prejudice at 1, Agui v. T-Mobile USA Inc., No. 09-2955 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010) (indicating
that the court “has reviewed in camera the parties’ confidential settlement agreement . . . and
determined that the agreement is fair and reasonable”).
96. See Complaint, supra note 94, at 3-4.
97. Id. at 4; see also Sanserino, supra note 10, at B1 (“Mr. Rulli said he was handcuffed
to his phone because the company required him to quickly respond to messages at any
hour.”).
98. Complaint, supra note 94, at 1.
99. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Part I.C.
101. According to Mobi, an Indianapolis-based mobile-device management company,
about one-third of U.S. companies have no written policies in place regarding the use of
smartphones. See Kristen B. Frasch, Sending the Wrong Message, HUMAN RES. EXECUTIVE
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for the analysis of the degree to which the employee is able to enjoy
personal activities while being on-call and using the smartphone, the factors
provided by the Ninth Circuit—a compilation of factors used by other
circuits and the Supreme Court102—are useful: (1) whether the employee
was required to remain at the employer’s place of business; (2) whether
there were excessive geographical restrictions placed on the employee; (3)
whether the frequency of calls was restrictive; (4) whether a fixed time limit
for response was unduly restrictive; (5) whether the on-call employee could
easily trade on-call responsibilities; (6) the method used to communicate a
call to the employee; and (7) whether the employee actually engaged in
personal activities while on-call.103
Under the first and second factors, whether the employee was required to
remain at the employer’s place of business104 and whether there were
excessive geographical restrictions placed on the employee,105 the court will
have to look at the nature of the smartphone use. One of the implications
and benefits of carrying a work-issued smartphone is being able to work
from any location and not being confined to the boundaries of the office,106
so an employee will always be disadvantaged by these two factors.
As for the third factor, which involves the frequency of calls being
restrictive,107 courts may find that responding to frequent calls and e-mails
on a smartphone could inhibit work-free time segmentation and interfere
with the employee’s use of free time for personal pursuits.108 The same line

ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.hrexecutive.com/HRE/story.jsp?storyId=199269117.
Even in the case of companies that do have written policies describing the boundaries of
device use, these policies “are most typically either to communicate the importance of
security measures (don’t lose it) or emphasize that it is a business tool and not for personal
use.” Porter, supra note 6, at 30. In addition to written policies, other sources for
understanding the expectations for device use are the employee’s own guesses about
intended use, oral instructions from management, and general understanding of
organizational culture and expectations. Id.
102. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B (describing flexibility as
one of the individual opportunities provided to employees by the use of a smartphone).
107. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of the implications for employees of after-hours smartphone use,
see Part III.A and Part III.B.
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of reasoning goes for the fourth factor, whether a fixed time limit for
response was unduly restrictive.109
As for the fifth factor, whether the on-call employee could easily trade
on-call responsibilities,110 in most situations involving smartphone use, the
employee is not able to trade responsibilities and is given the smartphone
with the expectation that she will use the device to perform her
responsibilities.111 The method used to communicate a call to the
employee,112 the sixth factor, is of course the smartphone. The seventh
factor, which concerns whether the employee actually engaged in personal
activities while on-call,113 will be a fact-specific analysis that is likely to
result in favor of the employer, due to the geographical flexibility afforded
by smartphone use.114
Thus, a proper analysis of smartphone on-call situations involves courts
going beyond the traditional framework of the on-call standard. A
comprehensive application of each factor of the current on-call standard to
smartphone overtime situations requires the courts to look at the nature of
smartphone use. Courts need to consider the opportunities afforded by
smartphone use and the negative effects of smartphone use, such as
geographic flexibility or blurring of work-free time segmentation.115 Even if
the current on-call standard does not pertain to the burden on the employee
and the benefit to the employee as factors,116 a proper analysis of a
smartphone overtime claim cannot be realized without scrutinizing these
two elements as independent factors.

109. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. It is most likely that the application of
this factor will be fact-specific.
110. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
111. See Mazmanian, Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 7 (discussing the expectations
created by providing employees with smartphones).
112. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part III.B (discussing an employee’s limited ability to enjoy her free time
while using the smartphone after hours). But see Middleton, supra note 6, at 172 (indicating
how some smartphone users did not regard the device “as an infringement on personal time,
but a means of controlling the work environment to better fit personal needs, offering
liberation, freedom and peace of mind”).
115. See infra Part III.
116. See generally Phillips, supra note 27, at 2641-44 (arguing that courts should
consider the burden that on-call time places on employees).
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B. The Preliminary and Postliminary Work Activities Standard and the
Smartphone
While Rulli described a smartphone on-call situation,117 there are also
overtime claims involving the use of smartphones to perform preliminary or
postliminary activities. One such overtime claim concerned a group of
writers working for ABC News.118 ABC News presented three writers with
a waiver indicating that they would not be compensated for checking their
BlackBerrys after work hours.119 The waiver prompted concern from the
Writers’ Guild of America, and in response, ABC News stripped all of its
writers of the company-issued BlackBerrys.120 Negotiations between ABC
News and the Writers’ Guild of America resolved the conflict, and ABC
News agreed to pay overtime to writers who put in substantial work after
hours and returned the BlackBerrys to the writers.121
Employees, like the writers working for ABC News, who want overtime
compensation for the time they have used their smartphones while
performing work activities that are preliminary or postliminary must meet
the current standard embraced by courts and prove that those activities are
“integral and indispensable” to “principal activities,” as well as de
minimis.122
While the Supreme Court in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez did not provide a clear
definition of the terms “integral and indispensable,”123 in Dunlop v. City
Electric, Inc., the Fifth Circuit described an activity as “integral and
indispensable” when it is “performed as part of the regular work of the

117. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
118. See Brian Stelter, ABC and Writers Skirmish Over After-Hours E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2008, at C4.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Buckley & Klein, BlackBerry Overtime, OVERTIME LAWYER BLOG (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.overtimelawyerblog.com/2009/02/blackberry_overtime.html (describing the
ABC News incident); see also Julia Boorstin, BlackBerry Overtime: Should You Get Paid
For Checking After Hours?, CNBC (June 24, 2008, 4:29 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
id/25353854 (expecting the ABC News incident to have an effect on the contracts between
employers and employees in creative fields, in that the contracts would be increasingly
specific about what constitutes work covered by the FLSA).
122. See supra Part I.D.
123. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); supra notes 77-81 and accompanying
text.
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employees in the ordinary course of business.”124 Arguably, an employee
who checks her e-mails before her shift in order to see and receive her work
assignment is performing a task “in the ordinary course of business” that is
“integral and indispensable” to the employee’s principal activities.
The de minimis analysis uses a three-prong test adopted by courts to
determine the applicability of preliminary and postliminary work activities
to smartphone overtime.125 The first prong involves consideration of the
practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional work.126 While
the time spent on a call can be traced from a phone bill and does not pose
any difficulty in recording, the time spent reviewing an e-mail or
responding to an e-mail is a more complicated issue. In that case, the
employer will have to rely on the employee to keep track of that time and
trust that the employee is being truthful in her rendition of the time
worked.127
The second prong requires the examination of the aggregate amount of
compensable work.128 The court must engage in a fact specific analysis of
the case, including how many minutes a day the employee was spending
checking e-mails and answering phone calls. When analyzing this factor, it
is important for courts to consider also that one of the effects of smartphone
use is compulsivity,129 which influences the amount of time an employee
will spend using her smartphone. As for the final prong, the court must
analyze the regularity of additional work.130 Importantly, an employee’s use
of a smartphone is in most cases frequent and even compulsive.131
As in the case of the on-call analysis, the analysis of preliminary and
postliminary work activities involving smartphones touches upon the
burden on and the benefit to the employee from smartphone use, and calls
for the addition of these two factors to the traditional overtime standard. By
considering the benefit to and the burden on the employee from smartphone
use, courts are better equipped in deciding whether an employee is working
within the meaning of the FLSA.
124. Dunlop v. City Elec. Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1976); see also supra note
82.
125. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. See infra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the compulsiveness provoked by smartphone use, see infra notes
134-137 and accompanying text.
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III. A NEW FRAMEWORK
The current overtime framework applied by courts in analyzing on-call
time situations and situations involving time spent performing preliminary
or postliminary work activities, is inadequate in the analysis of smartphone
overtime claims.132 A proper analysis of smartphone overtime claims will
require courts to adopt a new framework that will involve looking at two
additional factors—the benefit to the employee and the burden on the
employee from smartphone use. By considering these two additional
factors, courts will have all the tools necessary to decide adequately
whether off-the-clock smartphone use constitutes compensable work under
the FLSA.
A. Burden on Employee from Smartphone Off-the-Clock Use
Analyzing the burden on employees from smartphone off-the-clock use
is crucial when determining whether an employee should be entitled to
overtime compensation and will require that courts look at the employee’s
degree of compulsion when checking e-mail, as well as the employee’s
inability to disengage from work. Courts should contemplate how these two
factors affect the employee’s ability to enjoy her personal time and the de
minimis time analysis.133
Courts should consider the employee’s degree of compulsion when
checking e-mails or voice messages on the smartphone.134 An MIT Sloan
study has shown that smartphone use encourages compulsive checking of email and produces an inability to disengage from work.135 According to the
study, ninety percent of the respondents reported some degree of
compulsion when describing their own behavior with the device, and no
respondent was able to offer “substantive reasons, such as time-sensitive
132. See supra Part II.
133. See supra Part I.D.
134. Compulsiveness or “mobile email addiction” may be manifested through different
symptoms. See Ofir Turel & Alexander Serenko, Viewpoint: Is Mobile Email Addiction
Overlooked?, 53 COMM. ACM 41, 41-42 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“When using mobile
email, an addicted person may notice the activity dominates his or her thoughts and
behaviors, offers a thrill of relief, and is difficult to control or to quit this behavior. It
conflicts with other people and tasks, and causes negative emotions when interrupted. The
symptoms of this addiction may [also] dramatically affect an addict’s well-being.”).
135. See Mazmanian, Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 7 (outlining the experiences and
consequences of the use of wireless e-mail devices within a small private equity firm); see
also Whitney Stewart, Workday Never Done; Technology’s New Tools Test Labor Practices,
WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2008, at B01 (describing the MIT Sloan study).
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information or symbolic motivation, to explain their actions.”136 The
compulsive urge to check e-mails creates intensification in e-mail activity
during off hours and increased expectation about a rapid response and
frequent usage of the smartphone.137
Furthermore, courts should examine the inability of the employee to
disengage from work while off-the-clock. The employee’s compulsion to
check her smartphone frequently and the employer’s increased expectation
that she do so138 have led to the employee being unable to disengage from
work.139 Off-the-clock smartphone use leaves the employee without a clear
marker to signal a shift from “work mode” to “home mode.”140 The
employee has to deal with a work-life conflict and has to negotiate her own

136. Mazmanian, Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 7.
137. Id.; see also Middleton, supra note 6, at 175 (discussing how employees’
“perceptions of acceptable [high] engagement levels with their [smartphones] are influences
by organizational cultures that reinforce overwork and promote unrealistic expectations for
employee engagement in their jobs”); Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note 2, at 9 (indicating
that “many employees will say that being available after hours is a demonstration of
dedication that likely would be rewarded by the employer”).
138. Besides the three enumerated implications of the off-the-clock smartphone use,
generally using a smartphone in a work setting can prove to be distracting and anti-social.
See Middleton & Cukier, supra note 6, at 252 (offering “a study of contradiction in the usage
of mobile email”). Complaints about the impolite or disruptive usage of smartphone during
business meeting have become common. See id.; Alex Williams, Mind Your BlackBerry or
Mind Your Manners, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing BlackBerry etiquette at
business meetings).
139. See generally Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, Karl R. Lang & Virpi K. Tuunainen, Friend or
Foe? The Ambivalent Relationship Between Mobile Technology and Its Users, in DESIGNING
UBIQUITOUS INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS: SOCIO-TECHNICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 29,
35, 39 (Carsten Sorensen et al. eds., 2005) (noting that mobile technologies both empower
and enslave users and blur the boundaries between private and public space and
communication); Amy E. Mickel & Elise J. Dallimore, Life-Quality Decisions: TensionManagement Strategies Used by Individuals When Making Tradeoffs, 62 HUM. REL. 627,
628 (2009) (discussing the different options for decreasing the work-life conflict that stems
from the increasing work demands and the blurring of personal and professional
boundaries); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF
LEISURE 36 (1993) (providing statistics indicating that over a twenty year period Americans
have experienced a decrease in leisure time and an increase in work time).
140. Mazmanian, Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 7 (noting that the absence of a clear
markers leads to asking the question “[w]hen is it work time?”); see The CrackBerry
Backlash, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2005, at 58 (describing as a “particular challenge” the fact
that users must decide for themselves “when to use [the BlackBerrys] for work and when not
to”).
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work-life time segmentation.141 As the “interface of personal and
professional domains is competitive and conflicting,” this interface affects
the employee negatively through “increased stress and anxiety, work
interference with family [life], family [life] interference with work,
absenteeism, lower life and job satisfaction, and higher turnover
intentions.”142
B. Benefit to the Employee from Smartphone Off-the-Clock Use
Although there are negative implications associated with off-the-clock
smartphone use, smartphones also afford favorable opportunities to the
employees who use them. Courts should give great weight to the benefits
derived by employees from off-the-clock smartphone use.143 The benefits
that should be taken into account are: (1) the employee’s convenience in
monitoring work information; (2) the employee’s increased work
performance; (3) the flexibility afforded to the employee to work from any
location; and (4) the employee’s ability to use the smartphone for personal
use.
Courts should consider the convenience afforded by the off-the-clock
smartphone use to the employee. “[C]arrying a BlackBerry offers the
opportunity to monitor information flow, [as well as] . . . to control the form
of information delivery and receipt.”144 An employee using a smartphone is
able to check her e-mails in a fast and convenient manner and to screen
those e-mails she does not want to respond to by glancing at the sender and
subject line information.145
141. Mazmanian, Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 7 (mentioning that the negotiation of
time segmentation depends on individual desires, group expectations, job demands, and the
properties of the new communication medium); see Porter, supra note 6, at 6 (recognizing
that “[a] very high percentage of respondents preferred work segmentation (clear boundaries
between work and nonwork) rather than integration (permeable boundaries so that work and
nonwork commingle)”).
142. Mickel & Dallimore, supra note 139, at 630 (citing Stella E. Anderson, Betty S.
Coffey & Robin T. Byerly, Formal Organizational Initiatives and Informal Workplace
Practices: Links to Work–Family Conict and Job–Related Outcome, 28 J. MGMT. 787, 788
(2002)).
143. See Mazmanian, Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 7 (mentioning that while the
BlackBerry offers individual opportunities, its use also carries negative implications).
144. See id.
145. Id. (indicating that being exposed to the flow of incoming e-mail messages does not
necessarily mean interacting with the messages, but gives the employee the opportunity to
“keep an eye on” the e-mails that her employer is sending her); see Greg LaRose,
BlackBerry Jungle, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS, June 24, 2005, at 1B, 6B (describing the
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Courts should also scrutinize the effect of off-the-clock smartphone use
on the employee’s work performance. Studies have shown that using a
smartphone off-the-clock has also the effect of enhancing employee job
performance by allowing the employee to convert downtime into
productive time through twenty-four hour e-mail access.146 In addition, the
device provides a “[l]ocation-based work extension,” giving the employee
the opportunity to work from anywhere, be that a train, a bus, or a taxi.147
The flexibility to work from any location is described by some employees
as a “means of controlling the work environment to better fit personal
needs.”148
Furthermore, courts should consider whether the employer has given the
employee the opportunity to use her work-issued smartphone to make
personal calls and send non-work related e-mails.149 Being able to use a
work-issued smartphone for personal use results in the employee saving
benefits of being able to respond to e-mail messages instantaneously through the
BlackBerry).
146. See Alan Livingston, Smartphones and Other Mobile Devices: The Swiss Army
Knives of the 21st Century, 2 EDUCAUSE Q. 46, 47 (2004) (describing how “web-enabled
mobile devices help users become more effective, providing a variety of tools for different
purposes”); Middleton, supra note 6, at 170 (describing BlackBerry users as praising the
device for “intensif[ying] their working practices, so that they could accomplish additional
tasks within the traditional time and space confines of their jobs”); Porter, supra note 6, at 21
(concluding that the majority of people will say that use of smartphones enhances job
performance); Ipsos Reid, Research Study: Analyzing the Return of Investment of a
BlackBerry Deployment, BLACKBERRY.COM (2007), http://www.blackberry.com/downloads/
wes_presentation/Analyzing_ROI_of_a_BlackBerry_Deployment-2007.pdf
(ninety-six
percent of the respondents of the study agreed that carrying a BlackBerry made them more
productive). But see Karen Renaud, Judith Ramsey & Mario Hair,“You’ve Got EMail!”. . . Shall I Deal With It Now? Electronic Mail From the Recipient’s Perspective, 21
INT’L J. HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 313, 313 (2006) (arguing that “the constant
monitoring of e-mail actually reduces productivity”).
147. Middleton, supra note 6, at 171-72.
148. Id. at 172 (indicating that the routine to “work anytime and anywhere reflect
organizational cultures that value immediacy, and responsiveness”).
149. See Jennifer Stisa Granick & Kurt Opsahl, Your Boss and Your BlackBerry: Taking
Reality Into Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009, 9:44 AM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/12/21/your-boss-and-your-blackberry/ (indicating that “separate phones and computers
for work and personal matters are no solution because it’s simpler and more efficient to have just
one device”). But see Sewell Chan, City Workers Are Warned About Personal BlackBerry Use,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2008, 5:41 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/city-workersare-warned-about-personal-blackberry-use/ (describing the holding of the New York City Conflicts
of Interest Board Decision that city employees may use their BlackBerrys for personal
communications only if they keep careful track of such activity and reimburse the city for it).
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money by not having to buy a personal cell phone.150 However, an
employee who is allowed to use the same device for personal and workrelated communications should understand her employer’s policies
addressing the employee’s privacy rights before giving up her personal cell
phone.151
In sum, it is only by examining the burden on the employee and the
benefit to the employee from smartphone off-the-clock use, that the courts
will be able to make a just and comprehensive decision when analyzing
smartphone overtime claims.
IV. AVOIDING SMARTPHONE OVERTIME LITIGATION
Smartphone overtime claims are a new occurrence in the legal world.152
Moving forward, courts will have to adopt a new overtime framework.153
However, smartphone overtime litigation can be prevented and this Part
proposes ways in which employees and employers can avoid smartphone
overtime lawsuits. This Part examines the options that employees have in
avoiding smartphone overtime litigation—such as refusing to use the
smartphone off-the-clock for work purposes or asking the employer for the
delineation of off-the-clock smartphone use, and argues that employers
should implement smartphone use policies that are efficient and enforceable
to avoid overtime litigation.
A. Employee’s Options: Refusal or Limited Use
What can an employee do who has been given a smartphone by his
employer, was told that she has to use it after hours for work related
communication, and is not being compensated for that time? An obvious
remedy is litigation under the FLSA overtime provision to recover lost
150. See Joe, 8 Reasons to Get Your Employees a BlackBerry, BBGEEKS (Sept. 11,
2008),
http://www.bbgeeks.com/blackberry-issues/8-reasons-to-get-your-employees-ablackberry-88633/ (describing an employee who saves money as a happy employee).
151. See Jonathan Zittrain, Your Boss and Your BlackBerry—Total Monitoring on the
Web, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009, 9:44 AM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/12/21/your-boss-and-your-blackberry/ (indicating that in the private sector there is not
much workplace privacy unless the employee uses her own equipment and network and that
“employers can redraft their handbooks to give themselves as much latitude as possible in
snooping on employees”); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2633 (2010)
(holding that city’s review of an officer’s text messages on a city provided pager was
reasonable and did not violate the officer’s Fourth Amendment rights).
152. See supra Introduction.
153. See supra Part III.
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wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees.154 However, with
unemployment being at the high rate of almost ten percent,155 employees
might feel uncomfortable suing their employer and jeopardizing their job
security. Most likely, complaints about unpaid smartphone overtime will
emerge from disgruntled employees or laid-off employees.156
A solution for an employee who is given a smartphone is to ask her
employer to specify how many hours the employee is expected to use the
smartphone after hours and to keep an appropriate record of those hours for
the purpose of being compensated. Another option is, of course, to refuse to
use the smartphone after hours or to leave the smartphone in the office.157
However, this option might not seem convenient to the employee as it
might jeopardize her job security or promotion potential.158
B. Employer’s Options: Smartphone Use Policies
To maintain compliance with the FLSA overtime provision and to
prevent wage-and-hours claims regarding off-the-clock smartphone use,159
154. Litigation regarding claims for smartphone overtime use is a new issue and most
claims are still pending, so there has not been any recovery for lost wages so far. However, if
plaintiffs succeed in these lawsuits, wage recovery for overtime could be sizeable. For
example, in 2008, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD)
collected more than $185 million dollars in back wages for overtime. See News Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division Collects More
Than $185 Million Wage Recovery for FY 2008 (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/esa/archive/esa20090001.htm. Since 2001, the WHD has recouped more
than $1.4 billion back wages for over two million workers. Id. Furthermore, employees who
are not paid overtime are entitled to recover the amount of their unpaid overtime
compensation and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (2006).
155. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
October 2010, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
156. See Baldas, supra note 11, at 6.
157. See generally Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 IND. L. REV. 51 (2005)
(discussing employees’ right to refuse overtime work).
158. See Porter, supra note 6, at 6 (indicating that when asked whether it was acceptable
to decline the offer of an employer-supplied device, only about one third of the respondents
of the study thought that it could be done “without jeopardizing one’s current position or
one’s promotion potential, [while] nearly half did not know whether there was jeopardy
attached to declining”).
159. While off-the-clock smartphone use raises the concern of overtime liability, there is
also the potential employer tort liability associated with the off-the-clock employee use of
smartphone while driving; for example, if there was an automobile accident caused by an
employee checking her e-mails. See Middleton & Cukier, supra note 6, at 255; see also Ola
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companies should scrutinize their wage-and-hour policies to implement
smartphone use policies that are efficient and enforceable. As a first step, a
company should conduct an internal wage-and-hour audit or work with an
employment counsel to ensure that it is properly classifying its current
employees into the exempt and non-exempt categories. An improper
classification could cost a company a lot of money.160
Giving smartphones only to exempt employees who are not covered
under the FLSA overtime provision could be another policy.161 On the one
hand, this policy might not be feasible because many employees check and
use their smartphones after hours and are not exempt under the FLSA
overtime provision.162 On the other hand, “[t]his approach, while drastic for
some companies, virtually ensures that a company is able to accurately
track all working hours by nonexempt employees.”163
Another option would be to ban employees from using their smartphones
after authorized work hours.164 This option, however, defeats the purpose of
providing employees with smartphones, as most of the time employees are
given smartphones by their companies with the precise expectation that
they will be using the devices after hours.165
Svenson & Christopher J.D. Patten, Mobile Phones and Driving: A Review of Contemporary
Research, 7 COGNITION, TECH. & WORK 182, 182 (2005) (studying the effects of using a
mobile phone while driving).
160. See Beware of the Thorns in the BlackBerry Patch, supra note 11 (discussing the
financial impact of smartphone overtime claims).
161. See supra Part I.A (discussing exempt and non-exempt employees). Employers
should be aware that “to maintain the exempt status of an employee, the employee must be
paid his or her full salary for any week in which he or she performs any work.” Schlossberg
& Malerba, supra note 2, at 13. An issue might arise when a company has an exempt
employee who is on unpaid leave. Id. Also, if the employee checks her BlackBerry for workrelated calls for more than a de minimis amount of time, the employee would be entitled to
be paid to protect the exemption. Id.
162. An estimated nineteen to twenty-six million full-time wage and salary workers were
covered by the white-collar exemption in 1998. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 21, at 8 (indicating that the number represents twenty to twenty-seven percent of the
full-time labor force).
163. Carrie B. Rosen, United States: Wage and Hour Issues in the Blackberry Era,
MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING (May 30, 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.
asp?articleid=79978.
164. Alternatively, employers might prefer to limit non-exempt employees to spending
only a de minimis amount of time using their smartphones after hours. See Schlossberg &
Malerba, supra note 2, at 13. However, since there is no clear-cut rule as to what courts
regard as de minimis, it would be risky for an employer to adopt such a policy. See supra
Part I.D (discussing the de minimis analysis).
165. See Porter, supra note 6, at 5; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Some companies might find it preferable to require that employees get
permission first before using their smartphones after work hours.166 The
employer can set beforehand the number of hours that the employee is
allowed to use her smartphone for work related purposes and this way
authorize limited overtime compensation. This policy involves requiring
employees to keep track of the time they spend reviewing or responding to
e-mails outside of normal working hours.167 In this situation, however, the
employer must rely on the honesty of the employee, who can always claim
that she worked more overtime hours than she actually did.
For the purpose of keeping track of time, it is essential that employers
ensure that the company policy clearly states that employees must report all
time spent using a smartphone after hours and that failure to do so could
result in discipline.168 In the case of a policy whose violation would result
in an employee’s disciplining, the employer should have a procedure in
place for enforcing that policy.169 However, it is important to note that “[a]n
announcement by the employer that . . . overtime work will not be paid for
unless authorized in advance, . . . will not impair the employee’s right to
compensation for compensable overtime hours that are worked.”170
166. See Baldas, supra note 11, at 6; Doug Weiner & Frank Morris, Jr., Amid Tough
Times, Furloughs Can Save Employers Money and Employees Jobs, WAGE & HOUR
DEFENSE BLOG (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.wagehourblog.com/2009/04/articles/whitecollar-exemptions-genera/amid-tough-times-furloughs-can-save-employers-money-andemployees-jobs/ (indicating that a “good practice [is] to give employees clear notice
specifying that no ‘volunteer work’ is permissible and no work is to be performed unless
specifically authorized by a predetermined schedule or authorization by an appropriate
manager”).
167. While the employer can require the employee to keep accurate records of the time
spent working, according to regulations, it is ultimately the employer’s duty and
responsibility to keep accurate records of all time worked by non-exempt employees. See 29
C.F.R. § 516.2(a) (2010).
168. See Banks & Boden, supra note 85.
169. See id.
170. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #23: Overtime Pay Requirements of the FLSA, U.S.
WAGE & HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs23.pdf (last updated
July 2008); see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.13 (2010) (indicating that an employer “cannot sit back
and accept the benefits [of the employees’ work] without compensating for them”); Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (holding that an employer
may not avoid its obligations under the FLSA upon proof that its employees voluntarily
engaged in adequately compensated work); Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280,
290 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[O]nce it is established that an employer has knowledge of a worker’s
overtime activities and that those activities constitute work under the [FLSA], liability does
not turn on whether the employee agreed to work overtime voluntarily or under duress.”);
Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note 2, at 13 (indicating that while the employee is entitled to
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V. CONCLUSION
Employees who handle work-related e-mails, text messages, and
telephone calls after hours through their company-provided smartphones
are presenting real claims for overtime compensation under the FLSA, and
employers should be aware of that. In analyzing these claims, courts should
not only look at the current standards for on-call time and time spent
performing a preliminary or postliminary work activity, but should also
consider the burden on and the benefit to the employee from off-the-clock
smartphone use. Only by embracing this new overtime framework will
courts be able to make a proper decision regarding smartphone overtime
claims.
Furthermore, to preempt smartphone litigation, it is important for
employees to ask for guidance from their employers regarding off-the-clock
smartphone use and for employers to implement workplace policies that
regulate employee smartphone use. Through the adoption of policies that
are “workable, capable of recording all time worked, and uniformly
enforced,” employers “can reap the benefits from the ever increasing hightech world rather than the risk.”171

overtime compensation even if she was not authorized to work overtime, the employer
always has the option of disciplining the employee for violating the company’s policy).
171. Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note 2, at 13.

